Another year has passed in the Balkans—specifically across the region of the former Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia, but including Albania)—marked by aimless wandering and stagnation. For 2024, like many years before, was yet another year lost to empty promises and missed opportunities, where the grand ambitions of local political elites amounted to little more than hollow rhetoric. Will 2025 break this cycle, or will it simply bring more of the same?
Politicians around the globe are closely anticipating Donald Trump’s imminent return to the White House. In just ten days, his formal inauguration will signal not so much a new beginning, but the revival of familiar American policies centered on domestic priorities: revitalizing domestic manufacturing, reinforcing military strength, and prioritizing national security.
In all these areas, Balkan leaders have consistently fallen short. Meanwhile, plans are underway for the wholesale sell-off of natural resources through massive concessions on mining projects—on a scale previously unimaginable for the region. Small Balkan states are being positioned as new alternatives to resource powerhouses like Russia, China, and Bolivia, paving the way for intensified exploitation.
Yet Balkan politicians, too, are awaiting Trump’s return. This isn’t about shared values with American Republicans but rather a calculation that the new administration might, either through action or inaction, facilitate certain political processes in the region.
Vučić’s Fight for Power
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has worked the hardest to prepare for Trump’s return. In various ways, he has cozied up to the American establishment from both parties. Eventually, he began awarding lucrative contracts to members of Trump’s family. These deals are presented to the public as market-driven, though many claim they are attempts to buy influence. A similar pattern can be observed in Albania, where Prime Minister Edi Rama, an ally of Vučić, has awarded even larger contracts to Trump’s family.
During Trump’s previous term, Vučić and Rama worked on plans to partition Kosovo. Meanwhile, a portion of Albanian voters and political factions turned against Milo Đukanović in Montenegro. For years, Rama and Vučić have sought to undermine Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti, who opposes Kosovo’s partition and refuses to turn Pristina and Podgorica into Sarajevo-like entities with ethnically divided governance. The current U.S. administration has also joined the campaign against Kurti, imposing sanctions on Pristina.
The plan to partition Kosovo failed, according to statements from Serbia and implicit admissions by Vučić, largely due to opposition from German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Other European countries joined Germany in rejecting the plan. However, the current German government under Olaf Scholz seems more accommodating toward Vučić, focusing on access to lithium reserves in the Podrinje region and beyond.
Vučić’s broader political strategy has come under scrutiny, particularly after the collapse of a shelter at the Novi Sad train station. Serbian citizens have since demanded answers about who is building and operating in Serbia, what Vučić has promised to whom, and what future awaits the country’s people amidst the division of interests among global powers. Meanwhile, the judiciary remains silent.
Pushing Red Lines
Despite these challenges, Vučić continues to anticipate Trump’s return and has a plan. Previous attempts to destabilize neighboring states have largely failed, though official Belgrade achieved some successes. This is especially evident in Montenegro, where a Chetnik commander leads the parliament, and the Serbian Orthodox Church wields significant influence over the government.
Vučić likely hopes to achieve some of his goals by the end of Trump’s term, using 2025 as a preparatory period for larger moves. Western powers have allowed him considerable leeway in their attempts to distance Vučić from Russia. Consider just a few examples of what the West has forgiven him: the Banjska attack, irregular elections (according to EU institutions), interference in Montenegro, support for separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina via the so-called "Serb World," refusal to impose sanctions on Russia, and failure to align Serbia’s foreign policy with Brussels.
In the coming period, Vučić may once again test the limits of Western tolerance, counting on Trump’s support—not necessarily for Serbia but for himself. The European Union’s disorientation regarding Trump further supports his calculations, as Brussels debates how to replace aid to Ukraine should Washington withdraw its support.
Russia remains a significant challenge for Vučić. Increased Western pressure on Moscow could inevitably translate into pressure on Belgrade. Recently, Vučić has been discussing plans to acquire majority ownership of Serbia’s oil industry (NIS) from Russian hands, fearing potential U.S. sanctions.
To amplify the fear of external threats while suppressing domestic unrest, state-controlled media have emphasized supposed “Ustaše” conspiracies aimed at toppling Vučić, Vojvodina autonomy activists disguised as striking students and professors, and a Western plot to stifle Serbia’s growth. Provocations and incidents in Kosovo, Sandžak, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Herzegovina may also be on the horizon.
New Realities
The world has changed since Trump’s first term in the White House. Among Balkan politicians, only Vučić and then-Kosovo Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti faced significant pressure under Trump, particularly after committing to combat the “terrorist organization Hezbollah” and advocating for LGBTQ rights worldwide. That agreement, which also included Israel recognizing Kosovo’s independence, was publicly mocked by Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for Russia’s Foreign Ministry—a rare breach of Moscow’s diplomatic norms.
At the same time, Trump’s administration positioned Croatia as a potential energy hub for Europe. American strategists worked diligently to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy, laying the foundation for a new “Iron Curtain” against Moscow—a policy further strengthened under Joseph Biden after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Under Biden, Western policies toward Russia have become even more stringent, with initiatives like strengthening Poland and Romania further isolating Moscow. It is unlikely that Trump would significantly alter this trajectory. Even an agreement to end the war in Ukraine would not immediately lead to the lifting of sanctions or a restoration of Russia’s influence in Europe.
Trump’s primary foreign policy focus remains to contain China—a strategy he initiated during his first term and Biden continued. This could place Vučić and other Balkan governments with significant Chinese investments under greater scrutiny from Washington.
Ultimately, 2025 in the Balkans is likely to mirror previous years unless the West takes a firm and unambiguous stance, supporting only those partners who genuinely uphold democratic values. Without such a commitment, the region seems destined to remain trapped in its cycle of crises, where political "firefighters" extinguish the very flames they ignite—only to tighten their hold on power in the process.
Tekst je ranije objavljen na portalu geopol.ba.
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