The New Balkanization: How Putin’s Ukraine Playbook Mirrors 1990s Tactics to Force Western Complicity in Frozen Conflict

Russian President Vladimir Putin is playing multiple strategies in negotiations with his American counterpart Donald Trump, to secure a victory for the Kremlin in the war in Ukraine. Last week’s proposal indicates that one idea is the balkanization of Ukraine and "conflict management" by Moscow and Washington. Then, yesterday’s news from Moscow—they rejected Trump’s proposal to end the war.

Photo: Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump

The details of the negotiations between Putin and Trump, or their teams, are not publicly known. It is also unclear whether Kyiv would accept any agreed terms or whether European powers would agree to be mere observers in the division of influence zones in a country where, as Brussels has stated, "Europe and democracy are being defended."

The answers to these questions lie in the balance of forces on the battlefield, as well as in precise data on the resources available for this war. Since the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine, there has been talk of Kyiv’s limited resources. However, the public does not know how much of its resources (material and human) Moscow has expended or how much longer it can sustain this destructive and costly war.

Putin’s Proposal

Trump’s victory in the November elections was good news for Putin, if for no other reason than his promise to end the war in Ukraine before even entering the White House. Moreover, Trump has distanced Washington from its European allies, which is an additional advantage for the Kremlin and Kyiv’s greatest fear.

It is no surprise, then, that Putin has multiple proposals on how to handle the war in Ukraine—even if a lasting and mutually acceptable peace is not achieved. In that case, a "frozen conflict" would require "conflict management" by Washington and Moscow in the coming years, forcing the two nations into further contacts, negotiations, concessions, and plans...

A key precondition for this scenario is the balkanization of Ukraine—the fragmentation of this vast country’s territory, in line with the term coined about two centuries ago and consistent with the American approach to "conflict management," which Washington has applied, for example, in the former Yugoslavia since its disintegration.

"In principle, of course, it would be possible to discuss an interim government in Ukraine under the auspices of the UN, the U.S., with European countries, and, of course, with our partners and friends. To hold democratic elections, to bring to power a capable government that enjoys the people’s trust, and then proceed to negotiate a peace agreement with them," Putin said last Thursday. "I’m not saying there are no other options, but this is one of them, and such practices exist within the UN’s work," he added.

To support his proposal, Putin cited East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and parts of the former Yugoslavia (without specifying which) as examples of countries where "there have been instances of what is called an external government, an interim administration" under UN peacekeeping forces.

A few days later, yesterday, Moscow announced that it was rejecting Trump’s proposal to end the war in Ukraine—a proposal whose details remain unknown to the public—because it does not meet Russia’s interests. The Kremlin had anticipated this, so Putin had already prepared the international and domestic audience with his earlier proposal.

Targeting Zelenskyy, Weakening Ukraine

Putin’s proposal to install an interim government in Ukraine goes beyond just a plan to remove President Volodymyr Zelensky, whose term has expired. This time, the removal of Zelensky is not framed as a demand from Washington circles but serves a different purpose.

Sowing divisions in Ukraine—given its history and the power dynamics within its political, military, and business elite—could lead to various demands for regional governance across the country, depending on the status of Zelensky or any new president.

This statement by Putin is only a few days old, but the idea has been around for a decade. Controlling Kyiv from within was part of the Minsk agreements negotiated between Ukraine and Russia about ten years ago with French and German mediation.

The Kremlin interpreted part of the agreement as giving Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine veto power over all of Kyiv’s decisions—a right granted to entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and one that has been attempted, with varying success, in Skopje, Pristina, and Podgorica.

Accepting such a proposal would tie a country’s hands, forcing it into endless mediated negotiations with those who seek its destruction. In the case of the Minsk agreements, it meant Ukraine remained stuck between the West and Moscow—a battleground for decisions aimed at mere political and economic survival, with a temporary pause before renewed conflict under new geopolitical circumstances.

Kyiv reacted harshly to Putin’s new proposal. Alongside Zelensky, other officials spoke out bluntly, with one telling Putin to "take some pills to kickstart his brain activity."

Zelenskyy called Putin’s proposal an attempt to find excuses not to end the war. "He is afraid of negotiations with Ukraine. He is afraid of negotiations with me, and by excluding the Ukrainian government, he suggests that Ukraine is not an independent actor for him," Zelensky said.

The West’s Response

So far, Putin’s proposal has not impressed Washington much. According to Reuters, an unnamed White House National Security Council official, when asked about Putin’s statement, said that Ukraine’s governance is determined by its Constitution and its people.

Kyiv’s European allies will reject such a proposal outright—especially the UK and France. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and President Emmanuel Macron have repeatedly accused Russia of not wanting a fair peace in Ukraine. And shortly before Putin’s proposal, Starmer said the Russian leader was "playing games" and "buying time."

Whether Putin is buying time, playing games to divide the West, or doing both may be debatable. But there is no doubt that Putin wants to cripple Ukraine. His proposal, supposedly meant to "help" Ukraine, sounds like a mockery of common sense. Among other things, the Russian leader calls for "democratic elections"—something he refuses to hold in Russia.

There is also no doubt that Putin feels more complimentary with Trump’s return to the White House and appears, at least publicly, to be leading the game between the two. His demands and proposals seem to come from a position of strength, though it is unclear whether he is bluffing while hoping for a quick peace in Ukraine.

Putin has laid out proposals and demands before Trump, calculating that more agreements with the White House will ensure Moscow is not isolated from the West—or from Washington and the countries that follow Trump unconditionally. This would commit the U.S. to constant engagement and joint action with the Kremlin.

In practice, this means stripping Ukraine of its right to self-determination and thwarting Ukrainians’ aspirations to move toward the West—a promise made to them before Russia’s aggression began. Yesterday’s rejection of Trump’s peace proposal proves this and puts Trump in a position where he must offer the Kremlin even more, listen to Russia’s proposals, or end the negotiations.

This article was previously published on nap.ba.

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